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ARTICLES
THE TSUNAMI OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY:
WHAT'S A COURT TO DO POST-MCDONALD?
Stacey L. Sobel*
The Article's title is taken from Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent-
ing opinion in McDonald v. Chicago, where he predicted that the deci-
sion would unleash a "tsunami of legal uncertainty, and thus litigation"
because the Court failed to provide lower state and federal courts the
appropriate standard of review to decide the constitutionality of Second
Amendment cases. More than 190 judicial decisions have cited McDon-
ald in the fourteen months since it was decided, with many more still
being litigated. Without guidance in McDonald or its predecessor, Hel-
ler v. District of Columbia, the lower courts have been forced to find
their own way, and these courts have used virtually every recognized
standard of review to evaluate Second Amendment challenges. Unlike
other constitutional provisions, exercising the Second Amendment right
may result in the immediate harm to an individual's life. As a result, this
Article proposes that Second Amendment cases should be reviewed
under the test utilized in abortion cases: the undue burden test.
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Some Second Amendment proponents lauded the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller' and
McDonald v. City of Chicago2 as strong affirmations of the right to bear
arms in the United States. 3 These firearms supporters initially did not
realize that the decisions left a number of critical issues unresolved, such
as which standard of review to apply to Second Amendment4 legal
challenges under the Fifth5 and Fourteenth Amendments. 6
The Court's failure to provide lower state and federal courts with
the necessary tools to decide the constitutionality of Second Amendment
1 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2 561 U.S. 3025, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
3 See, e.g., Wayne LaPierre and Chris W. Cox, Statement Regarding U.S. Supreme
Court Decision McDonald v. City of Chicago, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.nraila.org/News/Read/News
Releases.aspx?ID=13956 ("Today marks a great moment in American history. This is a
landmark decision. It is a vindication for the great majority of American citizens who have
always believed the Second Amendment was an individual right and freedom worth
defending.").
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
5 U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ).
6 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Njor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ").
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claims has unleashed the "tsunami of legal uncertainty, and thus
litigation"7 predicted by Justice John Paul Stevens.8 Justice Stevens
wrote that "the Court could . . . moderate the confusion, upheaval, and
burden on the States by adopting a rule that is clear and tightly bound in
scope." 9 In the absence of such clarity, Justice Stevens opined that the
"decision invites an avalanche of litigation that could mire the federal
courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local
regulations comport with the Heller right-the precise contours of which
are far from pellucid-under a standard of review we have not even
established."10
Part I of this Article reviews how the analytical issues related to the
Second Amendment were created and how the Supreme Court has
applied various standards of review to constitutional rights in the past.
This section primarily examines Equal Protection and Due Process
analyses due to the Court's focus on these tests in Heller and McDonald
and the lower courts' interpretations of these cases. I Part II then looks
at the language regarding standards of review used by the Heller and
McDonald Courts in an effort to determine what standard may be
acceptable to a majority of today's Court. Part III examines the
standards of review that state and federal courts are relying upon in
reviewing the constitutional validity of firearms regulations post-
McDonald. Part IV proposes utilizing an undue burden test in Second
Amendment cases and examines the impact of the undue burden test on
the judicial review of firearm regulation in the United States.
I. DETERMINING A STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Constitution and its amendments provide gui-
dance to the courts regarding protected rights and government limita-
tions. The Constitution itself, however, does not provide information on
how the judiciary should review or evaluate claims of unconstitutional
7 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing Brief for Municipal
Respondents at 20, n. 11 (stating that at least 156 Second Amendment challenges were brought
in the time between Heller 's issuance and brief's filing); Brady Center Brief at 3 (stating that
over 190 Second Amendment challenges were brought in first 18 months since Heller)).
8 In the first fourteen months after McDonald, more than 110 Second Amendment
related challenges received written decisions citing to McDonald. This figure is based upon an
analysis of cases citing to the McDonald decision as of September 27, 2011 (list on file with
the author). The cases were reviewed to determine whether McDonald was cited for Second
Amendment analysis purposes or for a different proposition.
9 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 3115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I Some scholars and judges have also looked at the applicability of First Amendment
analysis to the Second Amendment, particularly in the area of time, place, and manner
restrictions. See Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 2011) (comparing Second
Amendment analysis to First Amendment time, place, and manner restrictions requiring
alternative channels of communication).
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acts. Consequently, courts have had to create tests to determine the va-
lidity of governmental regulations.
A. The Path to Uncertainty
The Supreme Court has developed a number of jurisprudential anal-
yses to determine whether a constitutional challenge meets the require-
ments of a particular constitutional right. Consequently, different
standards of review have been developed to address issues such as Equal
Protection, substantive Due Process, and freedom of speech and relig-
ion.12 The Court has not created a similar framework to determine the
constitutional validity of challenges to firearms regulations under the
Second Amendment. Heller and McDonald present an unusual set of
circumstances: a 220 year-old enumerated constitutional provision that
has seen little Court analysis.' 3
While Heller addressed the right of individuals to bear arms for the
narrow purpose of lawful self-defense in the home, 14 the decision's im-
pact was limited because the Supreme Court did not address the applica-
bility of the Second Amendment to the states.' 5 After Heller, a number
of cases were filed to address that specific issue.16 In a plurality deci-
sion, the McDonald Court resolved the issue by holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporated the Second
Amendment right recognized in Heller.'7
More than 190 judicial decisions have cited McDonald in the four-
teen months since it was decided, with many more still being litigated.18
Most of these cases questioned the validity of existing firearms statutes
or presented challenges to criminal penalties involving firearms.19 The
lower courts are presently applying different standards of review for Sec-
12 See discussion infra Part I.B-E
13 See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on MacDonald v. Chicago,
26 J. L. & POL. 273, 274-76 (2011) (explaining the lack of cases and scholarship related to the
Second Amendment).
14 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
15 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
16 See, e.g., Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states post-Heller); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am.
v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857-59 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that it is the Supreme
Court's duty, not an appellate court's, to incorporate the Second Amendment).
17 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. The issue before the McDonald Court was whether the
Second Amendment right would be applicable to the states due to incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 3028. While incorporation has great significance for Sec-
ond Amendment cases, this Article does not address incorporation related issues, but focuses
solely on how courts should review the constitutionality of regulations under the Second
Amendment post-McDonald.
18 This figure is based upon Shepardizing the McDonald decision on September 27, 2011
(list on file with author).
19 See discussion infra Part II.
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ond Amendment cases, and it is likely that one of these cases will ulti-
mately come before the Supreme Court for clarification on the
appropriate legal standard. When the Court establishes a standard of re-
view, it will encourage or discourage litigation depending on how strin-
gent a test is selected.2 0 Similarly, the lack of a standard of review will
only continue to encourage litigation because neither side will be able to
predict the case's outcome.21 This lack of guidance is basically an open
invitation to litigation. 22
Without guidance in Heller and McDonald, the lower courts have
been forced to find their own way. Many simply avoid standard of re-
view issues if they can fit the instant regulation into one of the categori-
cal bright-line exceptions handed down in Heller2 3 or if they can
demonstrate that the instant statute is sufficiently different from those in
Heller or McDonald.24 Other courts try to address the problem by pick-
ing and choosing from a variety of standards of review that the Court
previously recognized in relation to other constitutional amendments. 2 5
The fact that most of the Justices in the Heller and McDonald decisions
do a bit of mixing and matching from other tests complicates the matter
for lower courts attempting to craft sound legal decisions.
Unlike other constitutional provisions, the use of the Second
Amendment right may result in immediate harm to an individual's life.
As a result, this Article proposes that Second Amendment cases be re-
viewed under the same test utilized in the Supreme Court's joint opinion
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey26 and up-
held by the majority in Stenberg v. Carhart27: the undue burden test.
The undue burden test may not satisfy Second Amendment propo-
nents who advocate a restrictive strict scrutiny analysis for firearms regu-
lations28 or gun control advocates who believe that a rational relationship
or reasonableness test should apply to these cases. 29 However, the undue
20 See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment Right-Post-Heller Stan-
dard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 57-58 (2009) (citing FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993)).
21 Id. at 58 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1984)).
22 Michael C. Dorf & Erwin Chemerinsky, Three Vital Issues: Incorporation of the Sec-
ond Amendment, Federal Government Power, and Separation of Powers-October 2009
Term, 27 ToURo L. REV. 125, 137 (2011) (comments of Erwin Chemerinsky).
23 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
24 See discussion infra Part III.A.I.
25 See discussion infra Part III.B.
26 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
27 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
28 See Robert A. Levy, Second Amendment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the Hel-
ler Paradox, 33 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 203, 205-08 (2010) (citing Respondent's Brief at
54-62; Brief for Amicus Curiae Goldwater Institute in Support of Respondent at 14).
29 See id. at 207 (citing Dennis A. Henigan, Does Heller Point the Way to Victory for
Reasonable Gun Laws?, CATO UNBOUND, July 23, 2008, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2008/
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burden test does take into consideration the various interests at stake and
creates a meaningful test to review Second Amendment regulations.
Firearms regulations are not a recent invention,30 and it is estimated
that there are currently 20,000 gun control laws in the United States.31
While the Heller and McDonald decisions state that local governments
do not have carte blanche to regulate firearms, they do indicate that some
regulations will be permissible. 32 Courts will inevitably be asked to de-
termine which regulations are permissible and the appropriate way to
evaluate these laws under the Second Amendment.
This Article attempts to provide direction to courts grappling with
the responsibility of determining the validity of firearms regulations.
B. Equal Protection
In Equal Protection Clause3 3 cases, the Court has developed differ-
ent levels of review that apply specific tests based on the classification of
the group affected by the government's actions. Discrimination on the
bases of race or national origin, for example, faces the most exacting
level of review in strict scrutiny. 34 In order for a regulation to be valid
under strict scrutiny, a court must find that the regulation is "narrowly
07/23/dennis-henigan/does-heller-point-the-way-to-victory-for-reasonable-gun-laws/ (quoting
Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MicH. L. REV. 683, 686 (2007)
[hereinafter Scrutinizing])).
30 Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, The Second Amendment, and Historical Guide-
posts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 227,
228 (2010) (citing THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGs 69 (F.L. Attenborough ed.,
1922)) (noting that "arms" regulations can be traced back to the time of the Norman Conquest
when restrictions began on the carrying or use of "arms" as a means to prevent public injuries);
see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3131-32 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that firearms were heavily regulated at the time of the constitution's framing);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 683-86 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting
that colonial cities, including Boston, Philadelphia, and New York, began regulating the stor-
age and discharge of guns in the eighteenth century); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of
State Constitutional Law. 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 382 (2011) (explaining that forty-two states
protect an individual right to bear arms and two states are equivocal on the matter (citing
Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
191, 192 (2006); Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 711 (discussing the uniform history of gun
control among the states)).
31 Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, Issue Brief, The Standardless Second Amendment, AM.
CONST. Soc'Y FOR L. & Po'Y (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr%20
and%20Winkler%20Standardless%20Second%20Amendment.pdf.
32 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045-56.
33 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that the federal government is similarly limited by
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
34 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (asserting
that race-based affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (asserting that racial classifications are suspect and "subject to most
exacting scrutiny").
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tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest,"3 5 and it is no
more restrictive than necessary to achieve the purported governmental
interest. 36 Under this standard, the statute is presumptively unconstitu-
tional,37 and, in the Equal Protection context, the test is typically de-
scribed as being "strict in theory and fatal in fact."38
The Supreme Court reserved intermediate scrutiny for discrimina-
tion on the bases of gender 39 and illegitimacy. 40 Under the intermediate
level of scrutiny, a valid Equal Protection restriction "must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 4 1 The burden of proof remains with
the government, and it is "demanding" and not easily met.4 2
The lowest level of review is the rational basis test-a highly defer-
ential form of scrutiny. 4 3 In order for a regulation to survive rational
basis review, the challenger must prove that the regulation does not bear
a "rational relationship" to a "legitimate governmental purpose." 4 4 Most
Equal Protection challenges that are subject to the rational basis test fail
because it is relatively easy to find a legitimate governmental interest,
and courts generally give great deference to the government. 45 Despite
the ease of meeting the rational basis standard, there are successful Equal
Protection challenges, including cases where courts have applied what
some consider to be a more stringent version of the rational basis test4 6 -
often referred to as rational basis with a bite.4 7
35 Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S.
74, 82 (1997)).
36 Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 691 (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 416 (1997)).
37 Id. at 694-95.
38 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
39 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
40 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
41 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
42 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
43 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 677 (2006).
44 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687-88 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)); see F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993).
45 See Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314-15.
46 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-636 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
47 See R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection, Sub-
stantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions of Advancement, Rela-
tionship and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1291 & n.47 (1994).
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C. Due Process
Substantive Due Process48 challenges may invoke both Fourteenth
Amendment protections and Bill of Rights guarantees, which the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporates to apply to the states.49
Equal Protection and Due Process analyses exist in somewhat paral-
lel universes. While some constitutional challenges rely on both Equal
Protection and Due Process claims, courts apply different tests to analyze
the respective provisions. Equal Protection analysis focuses on whether
the government can meet the appropriate interest level required to justify
its discrimination against an individual or group based upon a group clas-
sification.50 Due Process, on the other hand, looks at whether the gov-
ernment's infringement of an individual right is sufficiently justified.51
Substantive Due Process claims may require courts to balance the respect
for an individual's liberty and "the demands of organized society." 52
Unfortunately, the respective tests and their applications are sometimes
interwoven without clarification.53
The Court's substantive Due Process jurisprudence includes strict
scrutiny and rational basis standards of review, yet these analyses are not
necessarily applied in the same manner as in Equal Protection Clause
cases. 54 For example, Due Process strict scrutiny is not as "fatal in fact"
as strict scrutiny under Equal Protection review, depending on the right
at issue.55 Similarly, Equal Protection strict scrutiny for race-based clas-
sifications is very exacting, but strict scrutiny analysis for fundamental
rights under Due Process is not applied as rigidly.56
In applying a Due Process analysis to infringements of fundamental
rights, courts often engage in the most stringent form of judicial re-
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... ).
49 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35 n.12 (2010) (citing examples
of incorporation of the First, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments).
50 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 793.
51 Id.
52 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)).
53 See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3115-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting); District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). See also discussion infra Part II.B.4 of United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
54 The comparative vigorousness of constitutional analysis is not limited to Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process claims. Many First Amendment free speech rights are more vigorously
protected than Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. See Denning & Reynolds, supra
note 13, at 277 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (holding campaign finance reforms violate free speech); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984) (creating the "good faith exception" to exclusionary rule)).
55 Gunther, supra note 38, at 8.
56 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny less rigidly
when the compelling state interest is in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud).
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view.57 However, not all so-called "fundamental rights" receive strict
scrutiny analysis; for example, there are a number of First,58 Fourth,59
Fifth,60 and Sixth6' Amendment standards of review that do not incorpo-
rate strict scrutiny in any way.
While Due Process decisions typically break standards of review
into the strict scrutiny and rational basis categories, some cases or types
of cases have carved out variations on the theme. There is no categorical
intermediate standard of review in Due Process claims like there is in
Equal Protection Clause cases, but the Court has fashioned at least one
test under substantive Due Process that lies between strict scrutiny and
rational basis analysis: the undue burden test.
The undue burden test is a heightened form of review, but it does
not fit neatly into one of the above categories. In Roe v. Wade, the Court
specifically stated that a woman has the right to an abortion and used the
strict scrutiny framework. 62 The Court then began applying the undue
burden test to reproductive rights cases post-Roe. 63
Casey's joint opinion declared that the undue burden test was "the
appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty." 6 4 The decision added that the use of
57 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (fundamental right to marriage);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing
decisions).
58 First Amendment cases utilize a wide variety of jurisprudential tests. See, e.g., Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding
that constitutionality of commercial speech is subject to a four-part test, including whether
there is a "substantial governmental interest"); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (ob-
scene material is not protected by First Amendment); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (using a variety of tests such as content neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions to assess indirect or incidental burdens on speech as com-
pared to cases that determine whether a restriction is narrowly tailored to a significant govern-
ment interest and leaves open alternative channels of communication).
59 Fourth Amendment cases utilize a variety of jurisprudential tests. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (directing courts to consider the "totality of the circumstances"
when determining whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity to briefly detain a
suspect); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that the legality of seizure
depends on an officer having "reasonable and probable cause" to search).
60 The Fifth Amendment requires "custodial interrogation" and consideration of the to-
tality of objective circumstances to determine if a suspect has been appropriately warned of
their rights. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
61 Courts use a four-part balancing test in analyzing the right to a speedy trial under the
Sixth Amendment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (considering the length of delay,
reason for delay, time and manner defendant asserted their right, and the degree of prejudice to
the defendant caused by the delay).
62 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
63 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (citing a number of
cases utilizing the undue burden test).
64 Id.
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the undue burden test left Roe's central holding intact65 and that "[a]n
undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its
purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion . . . ."66 The Court strengthened the precedential
value of the undue burden test with majority support in Stenberg v. Car-
hart.67 Almost all other Due Process challenges fall under a rational ba-
sis test that is similar to that followed in Equal Protection analyses. The
rational basis test in both contexts is typically easy to achieve but has
occasional bite. 68
D. Reasonableness Test in State Courts
State courts overwhelmingly applied the reasonableness test in pre-
McDonald cases to assess the constitutionality of firearm regulations
under state constitutions. 69 While the reasonable regulation standard is
similar to the rational basis test in terms of its relatively deferential na-
ture, the reasonable regulation standard is more limited-arbitrary laws
or laws that are so restrictive that they "destroy" or "nullify" the right
will fail due to unreasonableness. 70 Few state gun laws limiting an indi-
vidual's right to bear arms have been invalidated under this standard. 7'
E. Further Considerations
A court's work does not end once it knows the amendment at issue,
group classification, or nature of the right allegedly being burdened. A
court usually looks at other factors such as the public versus private na-
ture of the right at issue in order to determine a standard of review.
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, courts consider privacy con-
65 Id. at 879.
66 Id. at 878.
67 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
68 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Court focused on the right to pri-
vacy, but failed to articulate which standard of review it used in determining that the law was
invalid. See id. Even though the Court appeared to say that sexual privacy was a fundamental
right, it utilized rational basis language by stating that the Texas law did not further a legiti-
mate interest. See id. at 578. Some courts have interpreted this analysis as rational basis with
bite and have utilized the rational basis test in Lawrence's wake. See, e.g., Williams v. Attor-
ney General of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232 (1lth Cir. 2004) (upholding law that prohibits sale,
distribution, or possession of "sex toys").
69 Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 686-87 (noting that state courts have never applied
"strict scrutiny or any other type of heightened review to gun laws," and that state courts'
uniformly applied standard permits constitutionally reasonable regulations of the right). But
see David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1113, 1119 (2010) (disputing Adam Winkler's
statements that state courts do not apply strict scrutiny or any other type of heightened review
to gun laws).
70 Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 688.
71 Id. (finding only six published judicial opinions that have invalidated gun control
laws).
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cerns to be highest in the home,72 but the Court does not prohibit all
governmental intrusions of the home as a violation of these rights.73
Similarly, individuals have the right to possess pornography in the
home,7 4 but there are still valid constitutional limitations of that right.7 5
Further, timing may affect an individual's ability to engage in a right,
such as the ability to choose an abortion before or after viability.76 These
factors show that even when a regulation appears to fit into a particular
analytical rubric, courts will still look to other considerations to deter-
mine how or if the right is protected.
The Heller and McDonald opinions discuss many of the evaluative
issues above, yet the Court failed to select a specific standard of review
for Second Amendment issues. Part II below examines the language
these decisions used in discussing the various levels of review and the
implicated factors.
II. CLUES FROM HELLER AND MCDONALD
The Supreme Court's analyses in Heller and McDonald failed to set
a clear standard of review for lower courts to follow in future cases.
Heller avoided the issue by proclaiming that the District of Columbia's
ban was unconstitutional under any standard of scrutiny previously ap-
plied to enumerated constitutional rights.77 It does not appear that the
Court in either case was concerned by the lack of direction provided to
the courts.
There is, however, some language within the various McDonald and
Heller opinions that provide clues as to what evaluative standard the
Court may or may not find acceptable in future litigation.7 1 While the
decisions did not provide a standard of review for lower courts, they also
did not incorporate an unqualified Second Amendment fundamental
right. This section looks at Heller and McDonald's limiting language
and then focuses on the various standards of review discussed in the
cases.
72 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-40 (2001).
73 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (recognizing that warrantless
searches of homes are permissible if exigent circumstances exist).
74 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
75 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-09 (1990) (holding that Stanley should not be
read broadly and does not apply to child pornography).
76 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1992).
77 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008).
78 See infra Part IIA-B.
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A. The Second Amendment Right Is Limited
The Court noted in both Heller and McDonald that incorporation of
the Second Amendment did not prohibit all firearms regulations.79 Jus-
tice Scalia's majority decision in Heller stated that: "Like most rights,
the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases ... the right was not a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
for whatever purpose."80 The Court reasoned that even though a funda-
mental right's guarantee is fully binding on the states, it limits, but by no
means eliminates, a sub-federal government's ability to devise solutions
that suit local needs and values. 8 ' The McDonald Court noted that the
thirty-eight amici states supporting the petitioners declared that state and
local governments would continue to experiment with reasonable fire-
arms regulations under the Second Amendment. 82 Justice Stevens
agreed in his dissent that state and local governments should be able to
"try novel social and economic policies" as long as they are not "arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable."8 3
Some scholars have also focused on language in the cases recogniz-
ing types of presumptively valid firearms regulations:8 4
[The Heller decision] did not cast doubt on such long-
standing regulatory measures as "prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,"
"laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the com-
mercial sale of arms." We repeat these assurances here.
Despite municipal respondents' doomsday proclama-
tions, incorporation does not imperil every law regulat-
ing firearms.85
79 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); see also Denning &
Reynolds, supra note 13, at 296.
80 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted).
81 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046.
82 Id. (citing Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23).
The supporting amici further demonstrate this concept by citing to court decisions upholding
state and local firearms regulations. Id. at 3047.
83 Id. at 3114 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
84 See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 31, at 2; see also Robert J. Cahall, Note, Local Gun
Control Laws After District of Columbia v. Heller: Silver Bullets or Shooting Blanks? The
Case for Strong State Preemption of Local Gun Control Laws, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y
359, 384 (2010) (discussing the effect of Heller on certain state gun-regulation schemes).
85 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27).
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Justice Scalia's concurring opinion and Justice Steven's dissent agreed
that no fundamental right is absolute.8 6
The Court in Heller, however, noted that this list of presumptively
valid regulations is not exhaustive.87 The list may clarify the validity of
some regulations, but it also leads to questions regarding why some regu-
lations made the list and others did not and how those regulations that are
not listed should be evaluated in the future.88 For example, since not all
of the presumptively valid regulations date back to the time of the Foun-
ders, it is unclear how a court should determine which regulations are
longstanding.8 9
The Court also appeared to allow firearms that are commonly used
by law-abiding citizens but prohibited regulations that would eviscerate
the core right of self-defense in the home, such as those requiring fire-
arms in the home to be dissembled or locked.90 Consequently, future
courts may need to address the validity of firearms regulations on a case-
by-case basis depending on the type of gun that is subject to the particu-
lar regulation.
Heller and McDonald send the message that the Court will not pre-
vent state and local governments from limiting the Second Amendment
right in all circumstances. Because the Second Amendment right is not
absolute, courts need a consistent framework to apply to the regulations
that legislative bodies will inevitably pass. The Court will then be called
upon to provide an analytical structure for lower courts to determine if
non-presumptively valid firearms regulations not under Heller and Mc-
Donald are valid.
86 Id. at 3056 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The traditional restrictions go to show the scope
of the right, not its lack of fundamental character."); id. at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("More fundamental rights may receive more robust judicial protection, but the strength of the
individual's liberty interests and the State's regulatory interests must always be assessed and
compared. No right is absolute.").
87 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
88 Justice Breyer questioned the Court's haphazardly created rules relating to the fire-
arms regulations of felons, the mentally ill, sensitive places like schools and government build-
ings, and the commercial sale of arms. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3126-27 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer also queried why these regulations were valid but others were not.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the list of longstanding valid firearms regulations in
Heller and McDonald). Professor Mark Tushnet offers that these categories were tacked on to
the Heller decision in order to secure the fifth vote. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of
Compromise, 13 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 419, 420 (2009).
89 Some argue that the Second Amendment protects only those firearms existing in the
eighteenth century. See Heller, 544 U.S. at 582. But others suggest: "Just as the First Amend-
ment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modem forms of search, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at
the time of the founding." Id.
90 Id. at 628-30.
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B. Standards of Review
Based upon the McDonald and Heller decisions, the Court appears
unlikely to accept a number of proposed tests. By rejecting these tests,
the Court limits itself to what it may be willing to support in the future.
This process of elimination has led some scholars and judges to suggest
that a form of intermediate or heightened scrutiny standard will be the
only one available in the future.9 1
1. Rational Basis Rejected
The Court in Heller declined to use the most lenient test, the ra-
tional basis test, in Second Amendment cases:
Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate
the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guar-
antee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or
the right to keep and bear arms . . . . If all that was
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions
on irrational laws, and would have no effect.92
Even though fundamental rights are not always analyzed under the
same standard of review, it appears that the Court was not willing to
accept any version of the rational basis test, even one with a bite. Hel-
ler's language demonstrates that the Court will accord more serious treat-
ment to alleged violations of fundamental rights, including the right to
keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home.93
2. Reasonableness Test Rejected
Justice Alito, writing for the McDonald plurality, rejected the mu-
nicipal respondents' argument that state and local governments should be
able "to enact any gun control law that they deem to be reasonable." 94
91 See Cahall, supra note 84, at 363 (citing Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment
Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547 (2009)).
92 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 n.27 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Justice Scalia explained that rational-basis scrutiny is used to evaluate
laws "under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws." Id.
(citing Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-03 (2008)). He further
stated that for these types of laws, the rational basis test is not merely a standard of scrutiny,
"but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee." Id.
93 See Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
94 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (citing Brief for Munici-
pal Respondents at 18-20, 23).
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Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in McDonald suggested the rea-
sonableness test because it was used in many state court decisions.
These decisions generally held that state constitutional provisions pro-
tecting gun possession"5 "typically do no more than guarantee that a gun
regulation will be a reasonable police power regulation." 9 6  Justice
Breyer explained that these states have almost uniformly interpreted the
right to bear arms as providing protection from unreasonable regulations
and their "courts have normally adopted a highly deferential attitude to-
wards" firearm regulations. 97
The Supreme Court, however, largely ignores state doctrine when it
constructs federal constitutional rules, even when the states have a well-
articulated doctrine and the Court has not dealt with the issue.98 The
Court's rejection of the reasonableness test is consistent with this
premise.
3. Interest-Balancing Rejected
Justice Breyer's Heller dissent recommended an interest-balancing
test for evaluating regulations under the Second Amendment. 99 Justice
Breyer further explained in his McDonald dissent that, under this stan-
dard, courts would determine whether a gun regulation is constitutionally
valid by weighing the constitutional right to bear arms against the gov-
ernment's concern for the safety and lives of its citizens. 00 The Heller
95 Blocher, supra note 30, at 382 (forty-two states protect an individual right to bear
arms and two states are equivocal on the matter (citing Volokh, supra note 30, at 192; Scruti-
nizing, supra note 29, at 686, 711)).
96 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3130 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Scrutinizing, supra note
29, at 716-17) (italics in original).
97 Id. at 3135 (citing Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 686, 716-17) (italics in original). In
fact, in the sixty years prior to Professor Adam Winkler's 2007 article analyzing state constitu-
tional challenges to firearms regulations, state courts struck down only six gun control regula-
tions. Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 718.
98 Blocher, supra note 30, at 325-26. Some may feel that the dismissal of significant
state doctrine offends their innate sense of judicial fairness because they expect state and
federal courts to use the same rules to review constitutionally protected individual rights. See
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 278. Professors Denning and Reynolds compare Hel-
ler and McDonald to Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 947 (1954), which invalidated school deseg-
regation in the District of Columbia, and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
which invalidated state-mandated public school segregation. Id. The Brown Court said, "it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government." Id. at 278. If the Court establishes a standard that is "higher" than the states'
reasonableness test, it would displace state constitutional law on the issue and result in a new
round of litigation to re-examine regulations that were previously upheld in state courts under
the reasonableness test. See Blocher, supra note 30, at 383.
99 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689-90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3126 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sa-
lemo, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). See also, Ryan L. Card, Note, An Opinion Without Stan-
dards: The Supreme Court's Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Review in District of Columbia v.
Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations,
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majority rejected Justice Breyer's proposed standard, noting that it knew
of no other enumerated constitutional right that subjected its core protec-
tion to an interest-balancing approach.' 0 ' Such an approach, opined Jus-
tice Scalia, would not amount to a constitutional guarantee.102
Heller's dismissal of the interest-balancing tests utilized by state
courts did not dissuade Justice Breyer from urging an interest-balancing
test again in McDonald.03 Justice Breyer suggested that the Court could
make it easier on itself and other courts by adopting a "jurisprudential
approach similar to the many state courts that administer a state constitu-
tional right to bear arms." 04
McDonald's plurality did not venture far from Heller in rejecting
the interest-balancing test. Justice Alito simply noted the municipal re-
spondents' argument that most state courts have used interest-balancing
and sustained a variety of restrictions. 0 5 He then cited to Heller where
the Court "expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest
balancing." 0 6
4. Strict Scrutiny Test in Debate
The McDonald plurality left open for interpretation whether its des-
ignation of the right to bear arms for self-defense as a "fundamental
right" meant that strict scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of re-
view. Justice Scalia's reasoning in Heller that enumerated rights as a
23 BYU J. PuB. L. 259, 284-85 (2009) (discussing Justice Breyer's interest-balancing ap-
proach). While Justice Breyer's interest-balancing test and the proposed undue burden test
may appear to be quite similar, there is a real difference between the two: interest-balancing
pits one interest against the other while the undue burden analysis focus more on the burden
placed on the individual attempting to exert their constitutional right. This is discussed in
more detail in Part IV, infra.
101 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.
102 Id. at 634.
103 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3126-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 3126. See Blocher, supra note 30, at 381-82. Justice Stevens' McDonald dis-
sent also pointed out that respondents and their amici easily supported the fact that there is a
consensus among the states recognizing firearms rights, that arms possession is subject to
interest-balancing, and that there are ample historical examples of banning weapons used for
self-defense when it is necessary for the public welfare. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3113 n.42
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Municipal Respondents at 24).
105 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing Brief for Municipal Respondents at 23-31).
106 Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634).
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whole deserve strict scrutiny may tempt some scholars10 7 and judges'os
to use the highest level of review for Second Amendment related
regulations.
Justice Scalia quoted Carolene Products' famous footnote four' 09 to
bolster his support for a stringent evaluative test for enumerated rights.' 10
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review]
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . . ."In
Carolene Products' footnote four, however, specifically addressed Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence and was not a statement regarding fun-
damental rights generally. Justice Scalia's reliance on this language is an
example of the Court borrowing the reasoning from one constitutional
amendment's analysis to support the analysis of a different amend-
ment. 112 Scalia in no other way used Equal Protection review analysis to
evaluate Second Amendment claims.
Justice Stevens's McDonald dissent utilized a different part of the
Carolene Products' footnote to support his argument that the Second
Amendment does not call for a heightened judicial inquiry because there
is no "special condition" related to gun owners.' 13 He relied on the lan-
guage that addressed discrete and insular minorities as deserving more
107 See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Stan-
dard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 455 (2011).
Professor Malcolm supports a strict scrutiny standard of review, explaining that "fundamental
rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class status, the strict scrutiny applied to
the First Amendment . . . freedom of speech should also be applied to Second Amendment
rights." Id. (citing Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978-88 (2010); Citi-
zens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)). Professor Malcolm does
note that not all speech restrictions are accorded a strict scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 455
n. 114. See also Lindsey Craven, Note, Where Do We Go from Here? Handgun Regulation in
a Post-Heller World, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 831, 842-44 (2010) (citing Calvin
Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1132-33
(2000) (supporting semi-strict scrutiny); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's
Right to Bear Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 49 (1996)); Kopel & Cramer, supra note 69, at 1121-22
(citing to scholars, students, and others supporting a "semi-strict scrutiny" or a "deferential
strict scrutiny" standard).
108 See strict scrutiny discussion infra Part III.
109 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
110 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 n.27 (2008) (referencing Carolene Products footnote four
to signal that the Court will rigorously protect enumerated rights); see also Levy, supra note
28, at 206 (citing to Justice Scalia's use of Carolene Products footnote four).
111 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 n.27 (quoting Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
112 See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MicH. L. REV.
459, 475-76 (2010). Borrowing or "hedging" occurs when the Court selects one rationale
over another, but blurs the differences between the two. See id. Hedging may be seen as an
effort to reduce the risks and disadvantages of making a doctrinal commitment to a single
standard. See id.
113 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3115-16 n.48 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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searching scrutiny' 14 and concluded that gun owners are not a group
needing protection due to their considerable political power and the fact
that they do not appear to suffer from a systematic political disadvan-
tage. 115 Unlike discrete and insular groups typically accorded greater
protections under the Constitution, gun owners are viewed as politically
powerful and have influenced legislation and elections on the local, state,
and federal level. 116
This is another example of one of the justices looking to Carolene
Products' Equal Protection analysis but applying it to another amend-
ment in a different context. Here, Justice Stevens utilizes Equal Protec-
tion analysis to reject a strict scrutiny standard of review for the Second
Amendment by stating that gun owners are not the type of marginalized
group that deserves a more exacting standard of review.
Justice Breyer opposes strict scrutiny review on other grounds. He
opines that the Heller majority implicitly rejected strict scrutiny when it
handed down its approved list of firearms regulations cited above.117 If
these categories of restrictions are "presumptively lawful,""" then these
types of regulations would always serve a sufficiently compelling gov-
ernmental interest. As a result, a Court determination that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard of review would be strict in name only, and
the Court would consequently utilize a much weaker version of the test
than currently relied upon by Equal Protection and Due Process analyses.
5. The Available Standards of Review
By process of elimination, the only tests that remain available for
reviewing Second Amendment claims are some form of intermediate
scrutiny or a modified strict scrutiny analysis. 119 Justice Stevens's dis-
sent in McDonald provided suggestions on how to analyze Second
Amendment regulations in the future. Justice Stevens suggested that the
ultimate standard may be "more deferential to those laws than the status
114 See id. (referencing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 ("[P]rejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.")).
115 See id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Gris-
wold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 260 (2008)).
116 See id. (quoting Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4; David B. Kopel, Hold Your
Fire, 63 PoL'Y REV. 58 (1993)).
117 See Card, supra note 100, at 282 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
688 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
118 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26; see Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Stan-
dards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 572 (2009) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 688).
119 See Card, supra note 100, at 286-87 ("The intermediate-scrutiny approach is the only
standard not rejected by the Court . . . .").
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quo ante" and that the "courts will have little choice but to fix a highly
flexible standard of review if they are to avoid leaving federalism and the
separation of powers-not to mention gun policy-in shambles."l 20
Justices Stevens and Breyer looked at some of the additional consid-
erations that factor in determining the validity of a firearms regulation.121
Justice Stevens drew distinctions between the state's ability to regulate
private versus public acts.12 2 He concluded that an individual's Second
Amendment interest is heightened in the home while the state's corre-
sponding interest is weaker because the state generally has a lower inter-
est in regulating private acts. 123 He reinforced this point by referencing
historical state regulations of guns that imposed stricter and less contro-
versial restrictions for guns outside the home than for guns inside the
home.124
Justice Breyer's dissent, however, argued that the mere "use of arms
for private self-defense does not warrant federal constitutional protection
from state regulation." 2 5 Justice Breyer criticized the use of different
tests based upon the private location of the gun.126 As discussed previ-
ously, the Second Amendment, like other types of rights, may be treated
differently in the home, but this does not mean that an individual has the
unfettered right to firearms because it is so-called private or at-home
conduct.
While the McDonald plurality expressly rejected the interest-bal-
ancing, reasonableness, and rational basis approaches,1 27 it did not ex-
plicitly address the appropriate standard for evaluating Second
Amendment challenges. This lack of guidance has resulted in the judi-
cial "tsunami" that Justice Stevens predicted.128
III. SECOND AMENDMENT ANALYSES IN A POST-McDONALD WORLD
As Justice Stevens predicted, Heller and McDonald were just
the beginning of Second Amendment litigation.129 Scholars and
120 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3095 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae).
121 See discussion supra Part I.E.
122 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3103-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1305.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126 Id.
127 See id. at 3045-47 (plurality opinion).
128 See id. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Prior to the Court's decision in Heller, few Second Amendment claims reached the
United States Supreme Court. See Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amend-
ment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1535, 1540 (2009).
One of Heller's attorneys referred to the Second Amendment as "a sort of constitutional Loch
Ness Monster: Despite occasional reported sightings, many people-and certainly most
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judgesl 30 foresaw a period of litigation that would enmesh lower courts
in firearms decisions, by creating a volume of cases that some critics
believe the courts do not have the institutional capacity to handle.' 3 ' In
fact, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that the federal docket post-Heller "threaten[ed] to
suck the courts into a quagmire."1 32 These commentators see Heller as
the prologue and McDonald as the first battle in a long-term effort to
determine the parameters of firearms laws.133
There was relatively little litigation related to the Second Amend-
ment in comparison to other federal constitutional amendments prior to
Heller and McDonald.134 As a result, there was no real need for courts
to address which constitutional standard of review should be applied to
Second Amendment cases. This section looks at how courts have de-
cided cases involving Second Amendment issues post-Heller and Mc-
Donald, and then it more closely examines the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision, relying on a substantial burden analysis of a local firearms
ordinance.13 5
A. Avoidance of Standards of Review
One of the simplest ways for a court to avoid the standard of review
dilemmal 36 is to base its decision on one of the pre-approved categorical
distinctions provided by Heller and McDonald.13 7 These categorical dis-
tinctions include regulations related to felons, the mentally ill, sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, conditions and qualifi-
judges-were inclined to believe it did not really exist." Id. (quoting Clark Neily, District of
Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment is Back, Baby, 2007-08 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 127,
127 (2008)).
130 See Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1565 (2009) (citing
Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUB-
Ic, Aug. 27, 2008, at 34) [hereinafter Catch-221.
131 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 301 (citing William G. Merkel, Heller as
Hubris: How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the Constitutional World as We
Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221 (2010)).
132 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA.
L. REV. 253, 280 (2009).
133 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 301.
134 See supra note 129.
135 Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011).
136 See Brannon P. Denning, Essay, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship
and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 799 (2008) ("Lower courts may
refuse to infer a standard from the clues the Court provided . . . and may find it easier to
narrow Heller or even avoid it altogether.").
137 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (citing District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008)). See also Mehr & Winkler, supra note 31, at 2 (citing
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009)).
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cations on the commercial sale of arms,138 and circumstantial factors
such as home use.' 3 9 The courts that choose this avoidance methodology
merely look to see if the regulation is on the presumptively valid list
articulated in Heller and McDonald.140 If so, the court holds that the
regulation or alleged infringement is constitutionally valid, thereby opt-
ing out of any type of standard of review analysis by relying on the pre-
approved categories of regulations. 141
1. Presumptively Valid Regulations
A number of court decisions have analyzed presumptively valid reg-
ulations concerning felons, mentally ill individuals, and sensitive places.
Some courts cases involving felons' firearms rights have utilized specific
standards of review while others have used the categorical exemptions of
Heller and McDonald to dispose of the cases based on the felony status
of the individual asserting their Second Amendment right. 142 This issue
has been the subject of many court decisions since McDonald where in-
dividuals have challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922, a gun
regulation statute. 14 3 These decisions include United States v. Kanios,
where the defendant was charged with illegal possession of a firearm by
a felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 942(a)(2).144 The Kanios court
held that the defendant's indictment under these laws did not infringe
upon his Second Amendment rights because language regarding felons in
Heller and McDonald supported the result.145
The mentally ill related text has been discussed in cases such United
States v. Roy, where the court held that a defendant who has been invol-
untarily committed to a mental institution does not have a Second
Amendment right to bear arms post-Heller and McDonald.146
138 See id.
139 See supra Part II.A.
140 See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 381-82 (2009).
141 Mehr & Winkler, supra note 31, at 2 (stating that eighty percent of the more than two
hundred cases in a little more than a year post-Heller upheld firearms regulations based on a
Heller or other similar categorical exceptions.).
142 See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 695, 698-13 (2009) (surveying the history of state laws limiting convicts' entitle-
ment to possess firearms).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 Fed. App'x 52, 53-54 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
defendant's argument that possession of firearm by a felon was constitutional because he had
the Second Amendment right to possession at home).
144 United States v. Kanios, No. 1:l0crl00, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22609, at *2 (N.D.W.
Va. Feb. 18, 2011).
145 Id. at *3-6.
146 See United States v. Roy, 742 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Me. 2010) (citing United
States v. Burhoe, No. CR-06-57-B-W, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100397, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 21,
2010); United States v. Zetterman, No. CR-09-54-B-W, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25228, at *2
(D. Me. Mar. 17, 2010); United States v. Small, No. CR-09-184-B-W, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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According to Heller and McDonald, governments can make pre-
sumptively valid prohibitions on firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings.147 In cases such as Hall v. Garcia,
where the plaintiff claimed that deprivation of his right to openly carry a
handgun in a school zone violated his Second Amendment right, the
court took into consideration the language regarding firearms regulations
in sensitive places in determining that his Second Amendment claim was
not valid. 148 In United States v. Masciandaro, the Fourth Circuit also
looked to the sensitive places language from Heller and McDonald when
evaluating a Second Amendment claim related to carrying or possessing
a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle in a national park. 149 The defen-
dant, who claimed that he traveled extensively for work and frequently
slept in his car, said that he needed a gun for self-defense. 150 After ex-
tended analysis of the sensitive places language, the court stated that it
did not have to resolve any ambiguities raised by the parties relating to
sensitive places because the regulation passed muster under intermediate
scrutiny. 15 1
2. Location Distinctions
Courts have gone as far as creating another categorical distinction
not explicitly approved in either Heller or McDonald, possibly in an ef-
fort to avoid a traditional standard of review analysis. Courts have been
relying upon the public versus private nature of the use of firearms in
order to decide Second Amendment challenges. 152 Lower courts may
look to the fact that Heller and McDonald both narrowly discuss the core
Second Amendment right as it relates to self-defense in the home.' 53
Since neither case addressed a broader core right, some courts may be
willing to base their decisions solely on the location of the regulatory
infringement. 154
13698, at *2 (D. Me. Feb. 16, 2010); United States v. Murphy, 681 F. Supp. 2d 95, 103 (D.
Me. 2010)).
147 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (citing District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008)).
148 See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *5-6, 16
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (holding that the denial of plaintiffs request to be exempt under
California Gun-Free School Zone Act was constitutional under the Second Amendment).
149 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 2011).
150 Id. at 465.
151 Id. at 473-74.
152 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amend-
ment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1278, 1281-82 (2009) (applying the right to possess obscenity in
the home to the Second Amendment).
153 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
154 See Dorf & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 137-38 (comments of Erwin Chemerin-
sky); see also Charles, supra note 30, at 235 (stating that there is historical support for the
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For example, in United States v. Hart, the court held there was no
Second Amendment violation where the defendant was stopped for sus-
picion of a concealed weapon outside the home.15 5 Similarly, in Wil-
liams v. State the court upheld a conviction because the defendant was
not at home when he engaged in criminal activity.156 The Williams court
made the leap that only home possession is protected and, as a result, the
defendant's conviction for public possession of a handgun did not impli-
cate the Second Amendment.157 One court even suggested that there
should be different levels of review depending on whether or not the
firearm was in the home, with strict scrutiny applying to in-home posses-
sion and intermediate scrutiny for all other Second Amendment cases. 158
B. The Standards of Review Applied After Heller and McDonald
A review of cases eight months after Heller revealed that courts
were sometimes straining to distinguish the challenged regulation from
the one at issue in Heller.15 9 These courts frequently stated that the in-
stant regulation was constitutionally valid because it was much narrower
than the regulation in Heller, and, as a result, the court did not have to
engage in a full analysis.160 Additionally, the review noted that cases
that did engage in a little analysis quickly concluded that Heller did not
really change anything. While some courts lamented the fact that Heller
provided no guidance on the proper standard of review, few judges at-
tempted to figure it out on their own.161
Just as Heller created an avalanche of Second Amendment chal-
lenges, there has been a corresponding rush to the courthouse since the
Court handed down McDonald.162 More than 190 decisions have cited
to McDonald in a little over a year after the decision was issued.16 3 Ap-
proximately 115 of these cases arguably involved a Second Amendment
argument that only the "core" right of the Second Amendment should receive elevated protec-
tion and that regulations outside this "core" should receive minimized protections).
155 See United States v. Hart, 726 F. Supp. 2d 56, 60 (D. Mass. 2010).
156 Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1179 (Md. 2011).
157 See id. at 1177-78.
158 See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011).
159 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 295.
160 Id. (quoting Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)?
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 1245, 1259
(2009)).
161 See id. at 295-296.
162 Catch-22, supra note 130, at 1565 (stating that lower federal courts decided seventy-
five Second Amendment challenges to gun control laws in the first five months after Heller
and that "[elvery person charged with a gun crime saw Heller as a get out of jail free card.").
163 See sources cited supra note 8.
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claim.164 These courts utilized virtually every possible test to determine
the constitutionality of the Second Amendment right at issue.165
Some courts utilized a form of rational basis review for varied rea-
sons. In People v. Williams, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the
rational basis test applied to an Illinois statute limiting the right to carry
firearms outside the home because the statute did not implicate the fun-
damental right found in Heller.166 In Richards v. County of Yolo, the
court stated that the rational basis test should apply because the law at
issue did not "substantially burden"' 67 the plaintiff's Second Amendment
rights when their requests for concealed carry licenses were declined.168
The court in United States v. Barrett stated that the rational basis test was
appropriate due to the minimal burden of prohibiting controlled sub-
stance users from possessing guns under federal law.169
The opposite extreme, strict scrutiny, has been considered in only
one case post-McDonald.70 In United States v. Ligon, the United States
district court of Nevada discussed the lack of a standard in Heller and
found that strict scrutiny would be appropriate if individuals exercised
their fundamental right to use firearms for self-defense.17 1 The defen-
dant claimed that the weapons at issue were for self-defense, but the
court found overwhelming evidence to the contrary and concluded that
his argument failed even if strict scrutiny analysis applied. 172 Ms. Mehr
164 Id.
165 This is hardly surprising when one of Heller's own attorneys, Robert Levy, suggested
in one article that some sort of heightened review should be used but suggested in a second
article that rational-basis review with bite was appropriate. Gould, supra note 129, at 1551
(citing Robert A. Levy, Standards of Review: A Review, CATO UNBOUND, July 25, 2008,
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2008/07/25/robert-a-levy/standards-of-review-a-review/; Robert
A. Levy, District of Columbia v. Heller: What's Next?, CATO UNBOUND, July 14, 2008, http:/
/www.cato-unbound.org/2008/07/14/robert-a-levy/district-of-columbia-v-heller-whats-next/).
166 People v. Williams, 940 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
167 See discussion infra Part 1II.B.2. (discussing the "substantial burden" analysis pro-
vided in Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011)).
168 Richards v. County of Yolo, No. 2:09-CV-01235 MCE-DAD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51906, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
169 United States v. Barrett, No. 10-CR-36-WMC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99397, at *3
(W.D. Wis. June 30, 2010) (quoting United States v. Hendrix, No. 09-CR-56-BBC, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 33756 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2010)).
170 Post-Heller but pre-McDonald, other courts used a strict scrutiny standard. See Mehr
& Winkler, supra note 31, at 3 (citing United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 WL
667229, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.
Me. 2008)).
171 United States v. Ligon, No. 3:04-CR-00185-HDM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116272, at
*16-17 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2010). Scholars have argued that it is doctrinally impossible to use
strict scrutiny analysis for the Second Amendment while still upholding Heller's categorical
exceptions. Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Colum-
bia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 1371, 1379 (2009).
172 Ligon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116272 at *17-20 (noting defendant's concession that
the state had a compelling interest but rejecting the argument that the regulation was not nar-
rowly tailored).
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and Professor Winkler's review of all Second Amendment cases where
strict scrutiny was applied revealed that none of the regulations at issue
were invalidated, demonstrating that strict scrutiny has not been a signifi-
cant barrier to firearms regulations. 73
Other courts have applied some level of "heightened scrutiny" to
regulations.17 4 The Seventh Circuit engaged in a significant analysis of
Heller's language and determined that some form of "heightened scru-
tiny" should be applied.17 5  After comparing the Second Amendment
right to other constitutional rights, the court stated that the government
must establish "a strong public-interest justification" or, in other words,
it "must demonstrate that civilian target practice at a firing range creates
such genuine and serious risks to public safety that prohibiting range
training throughout the city is justified."'76 The government's burden, as
defined by the court, was not one typically associated with any type of
review.
The majority of courts have applied an intermediate scrutiny test.'7 7
One court specifically recognized that courts disagree whether intermedi-
ate or strict scrutiny should apply but chose to join the "courts holding
that strict scrutiny is incompatible with Heller's dicta concerning pre-
sumptively constitutional gun prohibitions."17 s
1. The Two-Prong Burden Test
Some of the courts using intermediate scrutiny employ the two-pro-
nged test laid out in United States v. Marzzarella.17 9 Under this test, the
court first determines if the Second Amendment right is burdened, and if
it is, the court implements "some form of means-ends scrutiny."s 0 The
appropriate form is most often an intermediate standard of review using
the traditional analysis wording-that the regulation must be "substan-
173 See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 31, at 4.
174 The courts are not alone in encouraging some form of heightened scrutiny. Former
Solicitor General, Paul Clement, suggested applying "heightened" scrutiny in his Heller brief.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290).
175 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011).
176 Id. at 708-09.
177 See discussion infra Parts I.B-C.
178 United States v. Oppedisano, No. 09-CR-0305 JS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127094, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (citing Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179,
187-88 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that the majority of courts apply intermediate scrutiny to gun
dispossession laws)).
179 See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
180 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
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tially related" to an "important governmental interest" in order to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the Second Amendment right at issue.1'8
In utilizing the two-pronged test, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that:
The Second Amendment is no more susceptible to a
one-size-fits-all standard of review than any other consti-
tutional right. Gun-control regulations impose varying
degrees of burden on Second Amendment rights .... A
severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of
armed self-defense should require strong justification.
But less severe burdens on the right, laws that merely
regulate rather than restrict, and laws that do not impli-
cate the central self-defense concern of the Second
Amendment, may be more easily justified.182
The Tenth Circuit used this two-part analysis in upholding a federal
statute that limited gun possession for individuals subject to a domestic
protection order and determined that the statute at issue was appropri-
ately reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. 183 In Hall v. Garcia, the
Northern District of California determined that a statute prohibiting gun
possession in a school zone was constitutional under the Second Amend-
ment because it had a "substantial relationship to the important objective
of protecting children on and near schools from exposure to firearms."' 84
Some Fourth Circuit courts that applied intermediate scrutiny used
slightly different language in asking if "there is a 'reasonable fit' be-
tween the challenged regulation and a 'substantial' government
objective." 85
Even though most courts utilizing the two-prong test are ultimately
making an intermediate scrutiny evaluation, it is possible that higher or
lower standards of review could be applied depending on the burden that
the regulation at issue places upon the right.
181 See, e.g., id. at 97-98; United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); United States v. Staten, Crim. Action No. 2:09-
00235, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91653 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 2, 2010).
182 United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614
F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
183 Reese, 627 F.3d at 800-02; see also Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642 (finding the prevention of
"armed mayhem" is an important governmental objective, and a statute limiting the gun pos-
session of those convicted of domestic violence is substantially related to that objective).
184 Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 17, 2011).
185 United States v. Lunsford, Crim. Action No. 2:10-CR-00182, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4753, at *16 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 18, 2011) (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683
(4th Cir. 2010)).
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2. Nordyke and the Substantial Burden Analysis
One court decision supports a different "burden test" to analyze
Second Amendment challenges." 18 6 In Nordyke v. King, gun show pro-
moters claimed that an Alameda, California ordinance, prohibiting bring-
ing or possessing a firearm or ammunition on County property,
prevented them from holding a gun show at the public fairgrounds.187 In
analyzing the claim, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme
Court left the task of articulating a standard of review to the lower
courts' 8 and then proceeded to methodically look at prior Second
Amendment and other cases to determine the appropriate standard of
review.
Nordyke recognized that other courts had found that heightened
scrutiny applies only if the regulation in question "substantially burdens"
the right to keep and bear arms.18 9 The Nordyke court further explained
that the Supreme Court looked to the extent that a law burdened the core
Second Amendment right to armed self-defense in the home, as laid out
in Heller. 190 The Nordyke decision then drew attention to the distinction
between what the Heller Court did and did not do: it did not consider the
government interest in preventing crime, but instead analyzed the regula-
tion's burden on the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.191
Nordyke stated that a strict scrutiny analysis is inconsistent with
Heller because the Court rejected Justice Breyer's "interest-balancing"
test.19 2 The Nordyke court also concluded that a substantial burden
framework is more judicially manageable than the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review because of the difficulties judges face in making empiri-
cal judgments. 193 The court opined that the substantial burden test would
not have as many difficult empirical challenges as strict scrutiny.194
186 See Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011). Although the local ordinance at
issue did not specifically mention gun shows, the Nordykes filed suit claiming a Second
Amendment violation, among others, on the ground that the ordinance hinders the conduct of a
successful gun show. Id. at 780-782
187 Id. at 781.
188 Id. at 782.
189 Id. at 782-783 (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469-70 (4th Cir.
2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680-83; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.
2010); Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (D.D.C. 2010); United States
v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to all
gun-control regulations)).
190 Id. at 783.
191 Id. at 784.
192 See id.
193 Id. at 784-85 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010)).
194 Id. (citing Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1443, 1461
(2009) [hereinafter Implementing]).
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The Nordyke court looked to other constitutional contexts that apply
a burden analysis and concluded that courts can use these other doctrines
for guidance in determining whether a firearms regulation is impermissi-
bly burdensome.195 After this review, Nordyke held that "only regula-
tions which substantially burden the right to keep and to bear arms
trigger heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment," 96 but de-
clined to state precisely which type of heightened scrutiny courts should
apply to laws that substantially burden the right. 197
The Nordyke court, applying the substantial burden test, first looked
to determine whether there were sufficient alternative avenues for re-
stricted activity.198 Nordyke stated that in order to determine whether a
firearm restriction substantially burdens Second Amendment rights, a
court should ask if the restriction leaves law-abiding citizens reasonable
alternatives for obtaining firearms for self-defense.199
The Ninth Circuit then directed its lower courts to take into account
whether there are reasonable alternative means for law-abiding citizens
to obtain firearms for self-defense purposes. 200 The case will be reheard
by the Ninth Circuit en banc, 201 so it remains to be seen how the substan-
tial burden framework will be utilized.
Nordyke is valuable for setting a framework to first determine
whether a substantial burden exists and, if so, then to apply heightened
scrutiny. Even though the case fails to state what heightened standard
should be applied, Nordyke's consistency in requiring a "substantial"
burden is preferable to the moving target created by the two-prong bur-
den test. The next section builds on Nordyke's analysis and proposes
that an undue burden test should be utilized where regulations impose
obstacles on the Second Amendment right.
195 Id. at 785-86 (reviewing Supreme Court burden analysis in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (applying rational basis review and allowing abortion regulations if they
do not place an undue burden on the right); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 874 (1992) (allowing regulations on the right to obtain an abortion); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791(1989) (finding reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions on speech permissible as long as the restriction is not too cumbersome); Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432 (1992) (rejecting the proposal that laws burdening the right to vote
must be subject to strict scrutiny)).
196 Id. at 786.
197 Id. at 786 n.9.
198 Id. at 787 (comparing Second Amendment analysis to First Amendment time, place,
and manner restrictions requiring alternative channels of communication).
199 Id. (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009)).
200 Id. at 790.
201 Nordyke v. King, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011). .
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IV. THE UNDUE BURDEN TEST: A SOLUTION FOR THE TSUNAMI
OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
The varied court responses to Second Amendment challenges post-
Heller and McDonald demonstrate the serious need for analytical uni-
formity on this issue. The biggest surprise in these cases is not that only
one court considered a strict scrutiny standard of review202 or that only
one created a substantial burden framework, 203 but that courts have de-
clined to apply any standard of review in more than half of the cases. 204
If McDonald's core fundamental right to bear arms for lawful self-de-
fense in the home is to have any real meaning, then it is imperative that
courts utilize the same analytical framework for the Second Amendment
right regardless of the judge or venue hearing the case. 205
The Court needs to establish a test that recognizes the serious nature
of gun use. At the same time, it must give some deference to state and
local governments while not eliminating the Second Amendment's core
right. An undue burden test would allow this to occur.
This test is not contrary to Heller because the decision addressed
only the narrow issue before the Court and did not discuss the outer lim-
its of the Second Amendment's core right. The fact that other Second
Amendment cases are likely to reach the Court in order to test the param-
eters of this core right does not impact the proposed undue burden test
analysis. This test is appropriate to decide the validity of any firearms
regulation, regardless of how the Court may define the core Second
Amendment right in the future. 206 The undue burden test protects the
core right, while acknowledging that some regulation is necessary. 207
202 See United States v. Ligon, No. 3:04-CR-00185-HDM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116272 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2010).
203 See Nordyke, 644 F.3d 776.
204 See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3rd Cir. 2011); United States v.
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Nicoll, 400 F. App'x 468 (11th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
205 See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 278 (stating that Americans expect the
federal and state governments to play by the same rules when it comes to individual rights).
206 Some scholars have argued that only the Second Amendment's core right should re-
ceive elevated protection, and interests outside the core right should receive minimal protec-
tion, especially if the infringement falls outside the founders' ideological and philosophical
understandings. Charles, supra note 30, at 235.
207 Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of
Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1,
84 (2009). A concealed carry law could be upheld due to the public safety concerns that
concealed firearms could facilitate unlawful conduct, yet this type of regulation does not in-
fringe upon the core right defined in Heller or McDonald. Id. See also, Rosenthal & Mal-
colm, supra note 108, at 443-45 (discussing the "core-and-penumbra approach" to Second
Amendment cases).
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A. Traditional Standards of Review Are Inadequate
As analyzed above, the Court is highly unlikely to establish rational
basis, reasonableness or strict scrutiny analyses as the appropriate stan-
dard of review for Second Amendment cases. 2 0 8 In some ways, interme-
diate review would be a simple test to adopt.
Intermediate and even strict scrutiny review of Second Amendment
challenges, however, may be ineffective due to the significant public
safety concerns related to firearms and the fact that public safety will
almost always qualify as an "important governmental interest" or even a
"compelling interest." 209 When strict scrutiny is applied to the Second
Amendment, it might not always be fatal in fact to the governmental
regulation because the government's compelling purpose will typically
be based on a public-safety consideration, such as preventing death or
injury to innocent people.210
As Professor Calvin Massey noted, "[s]urely [public safety] is a
compelling interest. What could be of much higher priority? The degree
of connection between this laudable objective and the means chosen to
achieve it would likely prove to be the litigation battleground." 2 11 As a
result, the only issue for a court to decide would be whether the regula-
tion is "substantially related" or "narrowly tailored" to that interest. The
determination of constitutional validity would then focus on the govern-
ment's public-safety interest, which would almost always trump the indi-
vidual's infringed right.
B. The Burden Is the Real Issue
Traditional scrutiny analysis should also be rejected because Second
Amendment review should focus on the boundaries or burdens of the
Second Amendment rather than the state's interest under the appropriate
standard of review. 212 A burden analysis is a better post-McDonald anal-
ysis because Heller and McDonald have already identified the core pro-
208 See discussion supra Part II.B.
209 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 754-55 (1987) (noting that safety and lives are
the primary concern of government, and preventing crime is compelling interest); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (public safety concerns justify individual
liberty restrictions)). Justice Breyer reasoned that any attempt to analyze the Second Amend-
ment under strict scrutiny would become an interest-balancing test of the Second Amendment
right versus public-safety concerns, with the only real question being "whether the regulation
at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter." Id. at 689.
See also Scrutinizing, supra note 29, at 727 (discussing the role of public safety as a compel-
ling interest).
210 Massey, supra note 107, at 1132.
211 Id.
212 See Tushnet, supra note 88, at 424 (recommending categorical balancing to determine
boundaries).
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tection and the presumptively lawful exceptions. 213 Therefore, the real
question today concerns the Second Amendment's boundaries. 2 14
The two-prong burden analysis, applied in cases such as Marz-
zarella,215 is a step in the right direction because it looks at the burden
that is placed on the core Second Amendment right. One problem with
the two-prong test is that it shifts the focus to the government's interest,
which is almost always constitutionally valid due to the public-safety
interests involved; consequently, the individual's burden becomes almost
irrelevant. Additionally, by utilizing a sliding-scale analysis that allows
all traditional standards of review to be used in Second Amendment
cases, courts applying the two-part test engage in an ad hoc process to
determine the standard of review based upon the level of burden in each
case.
No other right is subject to a constitutional analysis in which the
standard of review shifts on a case-by-case basis. 216 While a number of
constitutional amendments utilize a variety of tests, 2 17 their application is
consistently based on categorical determinations. For example, protected
content-based regulations of speech receive strict scrutiny analysis. 2 18 If
a two-prong test like the one that a number of post-McDonald courts
have suggested were applied to content-based regulations, courts could
use any standard of review to determine the regulation's constitutional-
ity, depending upon how severely the right was burdened in that particu-
lar case. Consequently, under the two-prong test, the same right may be
more or less stringently protected based on the burden, not on the type of
infringement.
Nordyke takes the burden analysis a step further. Nordyke's test
involves less legal guesswork than the two-prong test because only regu-
lations that "substantially" burden the Second Amendment core right re-
ceive heightened scrutiny and those that do not substantially burden the
213 Burden tests have been utilized in a variety of constitutional contexts including mar-
riage, abortion, freedom of religion, and expressive association. See Implementing, supra note
193, at 1454-55.
214 See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 31, at I (noting that the government has successfully
defended almost every one of the over two hundred post-Heller cases-only handgun regula-
tions in Washington, D.C. (Heller) and Chicago (McDonald) were invalidated under Second
Amendment).
215 See discussion supra Part II.B.l.
216 Some members of the Court may be reluctant to use this approach based on the
Court's statements regarding the interest-balancing test: "The very enumeration of the right
takes out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of Government-the power to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon." McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 634 (2008)).
217 See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc,
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
218 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
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right receive rational basis review. The Nordyke court, however, also
shifted the analysis back to the governmental interest and failed to select
a particular standard of review to apply when a right is substantially bur-
dened. Therefore, Nordyke allows courts to pick and choose their stan-
dard of heightened scrutiny, much like the two-prong test.
Professor Eugene Volokh explains that the "government often tries
to justify substantial burdens of constitutional rights by arguing that such
burdens significantly reduce some grave danger." 219 Even though a
court does not have to engage in a traditional standard of review analysis
under the burden evaluation, courts will sometimes try to fit the govern-
ment's arguments into traditional standards of review language by stating
that the law is necessary to serve a compelling state interest or is substan-
tially related to an important governmental interest. 220
The undue burden test does not apply a traditional standard of re-
view analysis to determine the constitutional validity of a regulation. It
simply asks if the regulation imposes a substantial obstacle on a person's
ability to exercise their right, and if it does, then the regulation is invalid.
This type of analysis focuses on the boundaries of the core right, not on
the government's justifications for the infringement.
C. Abortion, Tripartite Interests, and the Undue Burden Test
The undue burden test proposed in Casey has been criticized by
advocates on both sides of the abortion issue. Critiques of abortion-re-
lated jurisprudence often focus on the fact that reproductive rights are not
an enumerated fundamental right and do not deserve any level of height-
ened scrutiny analysis.221 Reproductive rights advocates find dissatisfac-
tion with the undue burden test because it lowered the strict scrutiny
standard of review announced in Roe v. Wade.222 It is likely that schol-
ars who find fault with the undue burden test will not support its use in
other contexts because it would confer additional credibility upon the
test. 2 2 3 The undue burden test, however, offers a legitimate parallel anal-
219 Implementing, supra note 194, at 1461.
220 Id.
221 See Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 453, 455 (1995)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
222 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Deborah A. Ellis, Protecting "Pregnant Per-
sons": Women's Equality and Reproductive Freedom, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 967, 972
(1996).
223 Judges may also find the undue burden test difficult to support. Some have suggested,
however, that a majority of Justices might unite behind this approach, even though Justices
Scalia and Thomas have repudiated the undue burden test as part of due process jurisprudence.
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 107, at 447 n.58 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
146-68 (2007) (stating that Justices Scalia and Thomas supported the undue burden test to
create a majority to reach the result they approved); Gould, supra note 129, at 1573-75).
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ysis to the issues that confront courts in conducting a Second Amend-
ment analysis of regulations.
This test is the most legally appropriate because of the tripartite in-
terests at stake in abortion and firearm regulation. Casey upheld the
three basic interests found in Roe v. Wade: the liberty interest of the
pregnant women; the state's "important and legitimate interest" in pro-
tecting potential human life; and the state's interest in safeguarding the
health of the woman, including maintaining medical standards. 2 2 4 Simi-
larly, there are important tripartite interests involved in firearms regula-
tion: the individual's interest to keep and bear arms; the state's interest in
protecting human life that may be endangered by guns; and the state's
interest in safeguarding the health and welfare of individuals, including
maintaining safety standards. These interests at their common core in-
voke the tradeoffs that governments must make between peoples' funda-
mental rights, the serious consequences that may occur when one
exercises those rights, and the government's need to promote community
welfare.
Professor Alan Brownstein offers that the doctrinal roots of the un-
due burden test can be firmly grounded in the fundamental rights case
law. 2 2 5 Brownstein asserts that the primary reason for supporting an un-
due burden standard is that no other approach "provides sufficient pro-
tection to the rights guaranteed by the Constitution without unreasonably
preventing the other branches of government from performing their con-
stitutionally assigned functions." 226
The Second Amendment has more in common with the unenumer-
ated right to abortion than with the other rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights because those other rights do not typically involve acts that have
the potential for serious immediate harm to the individual exercising the
right or to others. 227 For example, the First Amendment protects the
freedom of speech, but prohibited harmful speech is not protected under
strict scrutiny and is sometimes not protected at all. 2 28 Similarly, while
government infringement of an individual's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights could result in prison or even a potential death pen-
alty case, there is no immediate substantial harm. The courts have cre-
224 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 871, 875-76 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality
opinion) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 162).
225 Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 955 (1994).
226 Id. at 955-56.
227 See Jamie L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment Under a Government Landlord: Is
There a Right to Keep and Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
995, 1045 (2010) (citing Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Sec-
ond Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REv. 195, 236-37
(2009)).
228 See cases cited supra note 58.
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ated constitutional safeguards to protect a person's rights under these
amendments, including numerous opportunities to prevent a constitution-
ally invalid act from occurring or legally affecting an individual. 229 In
the case of reproductive rights and firearms, there is no appeal process
that can undo the harm once it is done.
If the government imposes, or has the purpose to impose, a "sub-
stantial obstacle" to a woman's ability to get an abortion, then it is cate-
gorically invalid, but if the burden is minor, then the regulation is valid
unless it is irrational. 230 Analogously, because the risks are so great
when firearms are at issue-just as they are in the abortion context-the
burden must be exceedingly severe to invalidate the infringement of the
Second Amendment right.
1. Application of the Undue Burden Test
It is likely that one of the cases discussed in Part III or one not that
different from them will come before the Supreme Court. Assuming the
Court adopts an undue burden test, Nordyke, for example, would be de-
cided in the following manner, with similar cases receiving the same
treatment:
First, the Court would determine if Alameda County's ordinance
prohibiting guns and ammunition on county property was an undue bur-
den on the Nordykes' Second Amendment right. The Nordykes never
alleged that the ordinance made it materially more difficult to obtain fire-
arms, that there was a shortage of firearms in the area, or even that the
regulation prohibited gun shows. 231 The local government merely de-
clined to allow them to host a show on county property.232 Under
Nordyke's facts, the Court would uphold the Alameda regulation using
an undue burden analysis because the regulation did not intend to, nor
did it actually, place a substantial obstacle on the Nordykes' ability to
exercise their core right to lawfully keep and bear arms for the purpose
of self-defense at home.
Conversely, the District of Columbia's ordinance at issue in Heller
would still be invalid because it imposed a substantial obstacle on an
individual's core Second Amendment right. 233
229 See cases cited supra notes 59-61.
230 Implementing, supra note 194, at 1471-72 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
158 (2007) (stating that abortion regulations that do not impose an undue burden need only
have a rational basis to be valid); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992)).
231 Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 2011).
232 Id.
233 The McDonald Court remarked that there have been few cases with bans on the same
broad level as those considered in Heller and McDonald and that the Municipal Respondents
cited to only one upheld law involving a comprehensive handgun ban. McDonald v. City of
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There are many other scenarios where legislation could be invali-
dated under this test.2 3 4 For example, many states delay a person's abil-
ity to acquire a firearm for a variety of purposes, such as giving an
individual time to "cool off' to reduce the risk of crime or injury, or
allowing sufficient time for law enforcement officials to conduct back-
ground checks. 235 These waiting periods-the time between the initia-
tion of a gun purchase and the purchaser's receipt of the firearm-last
anywhere from a few days to months. 23 6 Victims of domestic abuse may
find this regulation particularly burdensome if they seek to obtain a
weapon after a serious threat of harm or attack. 2 3 7 While it is likely that
waiting periods can be valid, excessively long periods may so eviscerate
the right that the regulation could fail under the undue burden test be-
cause it imposed a substantial obstacle to exercising the core Second
Amendment right. 238
It is impossible to predict how every hypothetical regulation will be
handled under the undue burden test, but this test, unlike any other, al-
lows the government to engage in its traditional police powers as it re-
lates to public safety without making the Second Amendment right
meaningless.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens's predicted "tsunami of legal uncertainty" 2 3 9 has in
fact occurred. The Court's Heller and McDonald decisions ensured this
result by failing to provide any real guidance to the lower courts.
Adoption of the proposed undue burden test will not be an easy path
to take. Many will disregard it due to its use in abortion cases. Others
will reject it because it does not use any of the familiar magic standards-
of-review words that lawyers are accustomed to applying, such as "strict
scrutiny" or "compelling state interest."
One litigator who argued a Supreme Court abortion case responded
to this Article's proposal of adopting the undue burden test in Second
Amendment challenges by asking, "Why bother going there when you
don't have to?" It would have been easy to avoid the controversial issue
of abortion by proposing something akin to an intermediate scrutiny test,
but the undue burden test is a more appropriate jurisprudential approach
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (citing Brief for Municipal Respondents 26-27 (citing
Kalodimos v. Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984))).
234 See Implementing, supra note 194, at 1475-1549.
235 See id. at 1538-39.
236 See id. (discussing a variety of state laws requiring waiting periods, including up to six
months for a handgun in New York).
237 See id. at 1538-39.
238 See id. at 1540-41.
239 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3105 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to a very grave issue. The undue burden test is the best test to protect an
individual's Second Amendment rights, while still allowing the govern-
ment to regulate extremely dangerous weapons that have the ability to
deprive others of their lives or liberty.
